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COMPANY LAW

Fallis and Deacon v. United Fuel Investments Ltd., [1963] S.C.R. 397.
In FaZlis et al. v. United Fuel Investments, Ltd.1 the Court had
occasion to review, and to confirm in the result, a unanimous decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal 2 in the obscure and controversial
field of "shareholder protection." In delivering the judgment of the
Court, Judson, J. not only acknowledged the very restricted status
which may be asserted in ordinary circumstances for the holders of
redeemable preference shares but was at pains, as well, to distinguish
(as the Court of Appeal had failed to do) between the case of a
"freeze-out" of preferred shareholders in accordance with their contractual liabilities, and the essentially different question of a majority
using its voting control unfairly to impose upon a minority of the
same class. The line between the two issues is a fine one-if, indeed,
it is capable of precise delineation; academics and legislators are alike
perplexed 3 by the intractable elements of the problem; the courts have
sought with only limited success to illuminate the boundaries for
purposes of definition and distinction; while those in the community
who perceive a sinister motive in every exercise of voting control are
disturbed by the inequities which appear to flow from these wellsprings of principle. The case itself is a text-book illustration of the
problem, but it is a virtue of the judgment that no final answer is
either attempted or given. The apparently conflicting claims of
"rights" and of "justice" are left in tantalizing equipoise, while the
law, for this dispute, is declared in terms which do violence to neither.
Judson, J. has done a service in identifying the case for what it isan important skirmish but not by any means the final battle.
The litigation arose through an application by the respondent4
company for a winding-up order under s. 10 of the Winding-up Act.
Section 10 provides that:
•The court may make a winding-up order... (b) where the company at
a special meeting of shareholders called for the purpose has passed a

resolution requiring the company to be wound up.

Section 13 of the same Act provides that:
The court may, on application for a winding-up order, make the order

applied for, dismiss the petition with or without costs, adjourn the hearing

conditionally or unconditionally, or make any interim or other order
that it deems just.

As the result of a reorganization which was approved by the
Court in 1939 after a period of severe financial reverses, the share
capital of the company comprised 90,000 6% cumulative redeemable
Class "A" preference shares of a par value of $50.00 ($4,500,000);
1 [1963] S.C.R. 397.
2 [1962] O.R. 162.
3 Cf. Gower, Modern Company Law, 2nd ed., cc. 23-25; M. A. Pickering,

The Problem of the Preference Share, (1963) 26 Mod. L.R. 499; Report of
the Company Law (Jenkins) Committee, 1962, H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 1749.
4 R.S.C. 1952, c. 296.
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90,000 non-cumulative Class "B" preference shares of a par value of
$25.00 ($2,250,000) and 90,000 common shares, without nominal or
par value, which were credited on the books of the company with a
contribution of $50,000. Subject to the rights of the Class "A" shares in
that regard, moneys available for dividends were distributable, share
for share, amongst the Class "B" and the common shares. The Class
"A" shares were redeemable on notice at any time, and were entitled
to priority on return of capital and a premium of $10.00 in the event
of a voluntary liquidation of the company. The Class "B" shares
were subject to purchase for cancellation at any time, and entitled
to priority on return of capital and a premium of $5.00 in the event
of a voluntary liquidation. Both classes of preferred shares were
expressly excluded from any further participation in the assets on a
winding-up and neither class (in the events which happened) were
entitled to receive notice of or to vote at any annual or special
general meeting of the company.
At the time of the proceedings in question Union Gas Company
of Canada, Ltd., a distributor of natural gas in southwestern Ontario,
held over 99% of the Common shares (which it had acquired in
1930), some 95% of the Class "A" shares and approximately 68% of
the 69,689 Class "B" shares which still remained issued and outstanding. The preferred shares had been acquired, for the most part, as the
result of an offer to purchase which had been made by Union Gas
in July, 1960, to the then holders of those shares. The appellants, as
Class "B" shareholders, had declined to accept that offer. The respondent company-United Fuel Investments, Ltd.-held a gas distribution
franchise for the urban district of Hamilton, Ontario, and although
its economic fortunes had been decidedly unstable from the time
of its incorporation in 1928 (the Class "B" shares having traded on
the Exchange from a low of $2.50 to a high of $70.00 in the twenty
years between 1939 and 1959) it was common ground between the
parties that its prospects for the future were exceptionally favourable.
In October, 1960, notice of a special general meeting was given
to the holders of the Common shares, and on that occasion it was
decided by a vote of 89,920 to 8 (a further eight shares abstaining)
that the company's undertaking should be wound up and its assets
liquidated. 89,906 of the affirmative votes represented common shares
owned by Union Gas Ltd. That company conceded, moreover, that it
proposed to bid for the assets in the liquidation proceedings, and in
view of the common shareholders' entitlement to the whole of the
proceeds after payment-off of the preferred capital, it was apparent
that Union could defeat all other bidders by offering an excessive
price which would be returned to it in any event as the holder of
virtually all the common shares. The result, of course, was the
appropriation of the company's promising potential to the holder (five
months earlier) of less than 1% of the company's paid-up capital, the
preferred shares having sustained the company in its years of adversity and suffered a tangible loss of at least $60.00 a share, on
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contributed capital and relinquishment of dividends, in a successful
effort in 1939 to preserve the company from total collapse. It was
not disputed, moreover, that some $3,000,000 of otherwise distributable earnings had been reserved for reinvestment in the company's
undertaking, a prudent restraint for which the Class "B" holders
would now be repaid through loss of their contractual right of participation. Acknowledge, finally, that the whole arrangement could
be carried by the shares of the beneficiary itself-for neither the Class
"A" nor the Class "B" shares had even received notice of the meeting,
let alone been given an opportunity to vote on the resolution-and
the picture of injustice and oppression would appear to be complete.
Unfortunately, however, the cause of the protesting minority of
Class "B" shares was doomed to defeat from the outset, since it was
plain from the language of the preference that the right to vote had
been relinquished without reservation or qualification, and that $30.00
was the most they could hope to receive on a liquidation of the shares,
whether through purchase by the company for cancellation or by way
of return of capital on a winding-up, and regardless of the fortunes
of the company or the extent to which its sanguine expectations
might in fact be realized. In only one respect could it be argued that
the winding-up would impair or destroy the economic value of their
investment and that, of course, was their right to share rateably with
the common capital in such of the earnings as might be distributed
from time to time by way of dividend. Only this right could account
for their volatile performance on the Exchange, but even then the
purchaser or holder faced "redemption" by the company when the
market price fell to $30.00 or lower-a price which could easily be
effected by a determined management with unfettered discretion in
the distribution of profits. The preference of participation had a
special value, therefore, only if the company maintained a high level
of earnings and the holders of the "B" shares could in some way
establish a vested right in the company's continued existence. But
in this latter proviso lurked the two threads of a fatal dilemma, for
without a vote they could not prevent a winding-up of the company
unless, in turn, those holding the voting strength, however minor their
contribution to the paid-up capital, could be compelled to continue
the company's operations for the common benefit of both majority
and minority. Only a sacrifice of clear legal rights could establish a
proposition of such patent frailty, and only then at the expense of
what the majority-of votes at least-might reasonably assert to
be their own claims for justice. It is true that the Judge of first
instance (McLennan, J.) dismissed the petition for the winding-up
order on the ground that the "shareholders" referred to in s. 10(b)
of the Act 5 were not in terms limited to "voting shareholders" 6-an
interpretation which was rejected in both the Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court-but even he declined to endorse the further
proposition which had ultimately to be established if the claim of
5

bid.

6 [19611 O.R. 801.

Supreme Court Review

1964]

the minority was to be sustained. Such, then, is the power of voting
control, even though that control should represent something less
than 1% of the company's contributed capital.
This, in turn, raises the disquieting prospect of judicial sanction
for the decisions of even a bare majority of votes, however offensive
the result may be to the sensitivities of a fair-minded observer. Indeed, had the case not been carried to the Supreme Court it would
be difficult in such cases to justify any effective restriction on the
will of the majority since Schroeder, J.A., in delivering the judgment
of the Court of Appeal, expressed the view7 that:
*

there is nothing in the evidence which points to the conclusion that

ini their decision to have the company wound up there was bad faith
or fraud or anything inclining toward that disposition of mind on the
part of the majority of the holders of common shares. What the company
proposes to do is completely intra vires and if the holders of the Class
B preference shares receive the price stated in the terms of the supplementary letters patent of 1938, they can have no just grievance against
those responsible for the passing of the resolution.

And again: 8
There is no real significance in the fact that United Fuel and Union
Gas have, except as to one director, interlocking directorates. The resolution with which we are concerned is a resolution passed not by the
directors but by an overwhelming majority of the shareholders entitled
to vote upon the matter. Union Gas being the owner of the majority
interest, the principle applicable was that stated by Sir Richard Baggallay
in North-West Transportation Co. v. Beatty (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589 at
p. 593, as follows: 'The general principles applicable to cases of this
kind are well established. Unless some provision to the contrary is to
be found in the charter or other instrument by which the company is
incorporated, the resolution of a majority of the shareholders, duly convened, upon any question with which the company is legally competent
to deal, is binding upon the minority, and consequently upon the company,
and every shareholder has a perfect right to vote upon any such question,
although he may have a personal interest in the subject-matter opposed
to, or different from, the general or particular interests of the company.

But with great respect, this is surely an instance of begging the
very question at issue between the parties, for it can reasonably be
argued, on both principle and authority, that the appropriation by
one group of shareholders of a company's assets under another
corporate guise-in a case, in other words, where there is no real
termination of the company's undertaking but merely an exclusion of
one group (in this case the largest group) from the rewards of
success-in itself constitutes that very element of "bad faith or fraud"
of which the victims complain.
9
In the leading case of Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works the
majority carried a resolution for the winding-up of the company and
the discontinuance of a claim for a valuable franchise which appeared
subsequently to have come into the possession of the majority shareholder. According to James, L.J. :10

[1962) O.R. at p. 179.
8 Ibid., at 181.
9(1874) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 350.
10 Ibid., at p. 353.
7
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The case made by the bill is very shortly this: the Defendants, who
have a majority of shares in the company, have made an arrangement
by which they have dealt with matters affecting the whole company, the
interest in which belongs to the minority as well as to the majority.
They have dealt with them in consideration of their obtaining for themselves certain advantages. Hooper's Company have obtained certain
advantages by dealing with something which was the property of the
whole company. The minority of the shareholders say in effect that the
majority has divided the assets of the company, more or less, between
themselves, to the exclusion of the minority. I think it would be a
shocking thing if that could be done, because if so the majority might
divide the whole assets of the company, and pass a resolution that every.
thing must be given to them, and that the minority should have nothing
to do with it. Assuming the case to be as alleged by the bill, then the
majority have put something into their pockets at the expense of the
minority. If so, it appears to me that the minority have a right to have
their share of the benefits ascertained for them in the best way In
which the Court can do it, and given to them.
Where, then, does one draw the line? Plainly, in the instant case,
the majority were appropriating, not an existing asset, but the
promise of future profits which belonged in both law and equity to
the Class "B" shareholders as well as to the common-but only, again,
if the common shares could be restrained from exercising their voting
control to wind up the company. As was said at the outset, it is the
virtue of Judson, J.'s analysis that the complaints of the appellants
were held to be unfounded, not because the voting shares must in
all cases carry the day, but rather because the very terms of the
preferred capital exposed the holders at all times to the redemption
which was now being effected. If, however, the appellants had been,
not the holders of redeemable "B" shares, but the eight common
shareholders who were not subject to redemption and had voted
against the resolution in question, we have a clear intimation that
the Supreme Court would reject the majority principle endorsed by
Schroeder, J.A. and examine the propriety of the move in the spirit
1
At the conclusion of his
of Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works."
12
judgment, Judson, J. is reported as having said:
Counsel for the Class 'B' shareholders relied on certain authorities In
the United States relating to the dissolution of solvent, prosperous
corporations.... Without going into details, these cases are all concerned
with a common problem, an attempt of a majority of common shareholders to get the assets of the corporation into another corporation In
which they alone are interested and the minority is not, and to pay off
the minority common shareholders in case. This is an entirely different
problem from the right to wind up for the purpose of redeeming preference shares. The dangers inherent in the use of dissolution procedure
in such a case are obvious. The first is that the assets may be sold*
by the majority to themselves under the cloak of a new corporation at
an unfair price and the second is the denial to the minority of the
opportunity to participate.
I am not overlooking the case of Castello v. London General Omnibus
Co. Ltd., (1912) 107 L.T. 575, referred to in the reasons for judgment
of the Court of Appeal. In that case the Court of Appeal in England
refused to restrain a sale of assets to another company exclusively owned
by the majority in the old company and compelled the minority in the
old company to take a cash payment. It is true that the cash payment
was, on its face, a very generous one but the shareholders did not want
3-Ibid.
12 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 408.
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cash. They wanted to stay with the company instead of being paid off.
The case is referred to with approval in the judgment of the Court of
Appeal but it is not the present case and I do not think it should receive
approval in this Court.
The trap was set by the compelling circumstances of the case at hand;
it is to the Court's credit that it declined to be caught.
D.B.S.

Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J. W. Enterpriseset al., [1963]
S.C.R. 144.
In the case of Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J. W. Enter-

1 the Supreme Court of Canada
prises Inc. et al. and M. A. Morrisroe,

considered the meaning of s. 128 of the Dominion Companies Act 2
and declared it to be intra vires the Parliament of Canada.

The facts may be briefly stated. Esso Standard, a Delaware
corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Company,
a New Jersey corporation, sent an offer to the shareholders of International Petroleum Company Limited, incorporated under the Companies Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 53, to purchase all the outstanding shares

of that company, as provided by s. 128(1) of the Companies Act.
S. 128 provides:
(1)

Where any contract involving the transfer of shares in a company
to any other company... has, within four months after the making
of the offer in that behalf by the transferee company, been 'approved by
the holders of not less than nine-tenths of the shares affected ... , the
transferee company may . . . give notice . . . to any dissenting shareholder that it desires to acquire his shares, and where such notice is
given, the transferee company is, unless on an application made by the
dissenting shareholder within one month from the date on which the
notice
was
bound to
given those
the court
to order otherwise, entitled and
acquire
sharesthinks
on the fit
terms
on which, under the contract,
the shares of the approving shareholders are to be transferred to the
transferee company.

In their offer, Esso Standard, the transferee company, stated that
Standard Oil, the owner of 96 per cent of the outstanding shares of
International Petroleum, intended to accept the offer. Esso Standard
would thus be in a position to give notice under s. 128(1) for the

compulsory acquisition of the shares of all shareholders who did not
accept the offer. Less than 90 per cent of the free shares accepted

within the required time.
Esso Standard obtained an ex parte order from the court under

s. 128. The present case arose when the present respondents moved
for an order setting aside the ex parte order. The Court of Appeal,

Schroeder, J.A. dissenting, allowed appeals from Wells, J. who had
dismissed the motions, and declared that "Esso-Standard

(Inter-

America) Inc., is not entitled nor bound to acquire the shares of the
1 [19631 S.C.R. 144.
2R.S.C. 1952, c. 53.

